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Policy Research Working Paper 5096
The authors use recent data from the 2006 National 
Family Health Survey of India to explore the relationship 
between religion and demographic behavior. They 
find that fertility and mortality vary not only between 
religious groups, but also across caste groups. These 
groups also differ with respect to socio-economic status. 
The central finding of this paper is that despite their 
socio-economic disadvantages, Muslims have higher 
fertility than their Hindu counterparts and also exhibit 
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lower levels of infant mortality (particularly female 
infant mortality). This effect is robust to the inclusion of 
controls for non-religious factors such as socio-economic 
status and area of residence. This result has important 
policy implications because it suggests that India's 
problem of “missing women” may be concentrated in 
particular groups. The authors conclude that religion and 
caste play a key role in determining the demographic 
characteristics of India.Missing Women and India's Religious Demography
Vani Borooahy Quy-Toan Doz Sriya Iyerx Shareen Joshi{
1 Introduction
Two features of India's demography have recently received a great deal of attention. The
rst is gender bias - the small number of females compared to males (Visaria, 1971; Dyson
and Moore, 1983; Sen, 1992, 2001; Kishor, 1993; Das Gupta, 2005). According to the 2001
Census, India has 933 females for every 1000 males, which implies that as many as 35{37
million women in India may be \missing" (Dr eze and Sen, 1996; Klasen, 1994; Agnihotri,
2000; Sen, 2003; Oster, 2005).1 The second feature is that demographic variables in India
vary sharply by religious group. Fertility and the population growth rate for example,
are higher among Muslims than Hindus (Basu 1997; Jeery and Jeery 1997; Iyer 2002;
Dharmalingam and Morgan, 2004).2
In the literature on Indian demography, both these issues have received enormous at-
tention, but they have typically been studied independently of each other. The adverse sex
For helpful discussions we are grateful to Robert Barro, Eli Berman, Edward Glaeser, Timothy Guinnane,
Monica Das Gupta, Partha Dasgupta, Larry Iannaccone, Siddiq Osmani, Abusaleh Shari, Chander Velu,
David Voas, and to participants at the American Economic Association 2007 meetings in Chicago, the
`Religion, Economics and Culture' 2004 Annual Meetings in Kansas City, Missouri, and the 2005 ESRC
seminar on `Demography and Religion' in Lancaster, UK. We are also grateful to Sarina Siddhanti for
excellent research assistance, We are especially grateful to the Editor and two anonymous referees for their
invaluable comments.
yFaculty of Economics and Politics, University of Ulster, Northern Ireland. vk.borooah@ulst.ac.uk
zDevelopment Economics Research Group, The World Bank. qdo@worldbank.org
xCorresponding author: Faculty of Economics and St. Catharine's College, University of Cambridge,
Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge CB3 9DD, United Kingdom. Tel: 44 1223 335257; Fax: 44 1223 335475;
Email: Sriya.Iyer@econ.cam.ac.uk
{The School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. shareen.joshi@gmail.com
1The estimate of the number of missing women is based on comparisons with Europe and North America
which have 1050 females per 1000 males.
2An often-cited gure from the National Family Health Survey conducted in 1998-99, shows that the
Total Fertility Rate (TFR) for Hindus and Muslims was 2.8 and 3.6 respectively.
1ratio is mainly discussed in the context of the preference that many South and East Asian
families have for sons over daughters (`son preference') and related issues that concern the
marriage market, fertility, and dowry (Edlund, 1999; Bhat and Zavier, 2003; Sen, 2001;
Rao, 1993; Bloch and Rao, 2002; Botticini and Siow, 2003; Das Gupta, 2005; Jacoby and
Mansuri, 2006). The demographic dierences between Hindus and Muslims, on the other
hand, have usually been discussed in terms of the number of children in Muslim families
and the higher population growth rates of this community. However, the debate often over-
looked the fact that infant mortality among Muslims (at 59 per 1000) is much lower than
that among Hindus (at 77 per 1000) as documented in Borooah and Iyer (2005a). Similarly
child mortality, which is 83 per 1000 for Muslims, is substantially lower than child mortality
among Hindus, at 107 per 1000 (IIPS and ORC Macro International, 2000). The survival
advantage of Muslim children despite the higher fertility of their mothers is particularly
puzzling in light of the fact that Muslims in India are typically poorer than Hindus as
highlighted by the Sachar Committee Report (Government of India, 2006). Even a cursory
glance at these facts and gures suggests that religious dierentials in infant mortality need
to be examined more closely.
In this paper, we link these two separately-studied demographic realities into a com-
parative analysis of infant mortality across religious and caste groups, using data from the
newly released National Family Health Survey of 2005-06. To do so, we rst divide our
population into three subgroups: non-Dalit Hindus (also known as upper-caste Hindus),
Dalit Hindus (also known as lower-caste Hindus), and Muslims. Our preliminary compara-
tive analysis nds that with respect to observable socio-economic characteristics, Muslims
are similar to Hindu Dalits in that they have lower levels of education, are poorer than
non-Dalit Hindus. They also have more children, are less likely to experience the death of
a child (particularly a girl), have higher female-male sex ratios among children alive as well
as among children ever-born, are less likely to use contraception, and have preferences for a
greater number of girls as well as boys. The next step of our analysis is to estimate survival
probabilities for children and control for a number of important socio-economic, geographic
and demographic variables. Our ndings conrm that Muslim infant and child mortality
is considerably lower than that for the Hindus, even after accounting for the wide range
of socio-economic characteristics available to us. The eect is particularly strong for girls.
Female infant mortality rates are lower in Muslim families than in Hindu families even with
the inclusion of numerous controls for household and community characteristics. The nal
2step of our analysis involves a series of robustness checks. We nd that our results are
upheld. Although we cannot rule out all possible alternative rationales, or the possibility
that socio-economic status may be insuciently captured by our controls, these results lend
support to the conjecture that religion might play a direct role in explaining the dierences
in gender dierences in mortality between the Hindus and Muslims of India.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the role of religion in Indian demog-
raphy and establishes our conjecture; Section 3 conducts a comparative analysis of non-Dalit
Hindus, Dalit Hindus and Muslims. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Role of Religion in Indian Demography
The idea that religion can shape demographic behavior is not new, particularly in the con-
text of South Asia. Most of the existing literature on religion and demography however,
focuses on fertility alone. Two main theories have dominated the discussion of religious
dierences in Indian fertility rates. The `characteristics hypothesis' proposes that the rel-
ative poverty and lower education levels of Muslims drive fertility and mortality patterns
that are dierent than those observed among Hindus (Iyer, 2002). In contrast to this, the
`particularized theology hypothesis' - or the 'pure religion eect' argues that the intellec-
tual content of religion aects fertility directly. Proponents of this hypothesis point out
that religious injunctions in favor of multiple wives, large numbers of children, and a ban
on the use of contraception and abortion may encourage higher fertility among Muslims.
Such arguments however, have also been made for Hindus. The Mysore Population Study
conducted in 1961, for example, concluded that Hindu religious traditions in Indian society
favored having many ospring (United Nations, 1961).
We believe that the focus on fertility, to the exclusion of other demographic variables
such as mortality and the sex-composition of o-spring, is incomplete. For the remainder of
this section, we document the dierences in beliefs and norms between Hindus and Muslims
that may impact their perceived benets of sons versus daughters.
In Islam, the institutional requirements of the religion are specied in the Sharia or
Islamic law which is derived from two main sources { the Koran and the Sunnah, and also
the writings of the medieval theologian Al Ghazzali, often cited by Muslim clerics, who
3summarized Sunni and Shia positions on demography-related issues such as marriage and
birth control (Al Ghazzali, 1909).3 In the case of Hinduism we consider religious texts
such as Vedas, and Upanishads (Radhakrishnan, 1923); epic poems such as the Ramayana
and Mahabharata (Deshpande, 1978); social commentaries such as Kautilya's Arthasastra
(Shamasastry, 1951); and verse-poems in praise of Hindu goddesses such as the Lalita-
sahasranama and the Sri-sukta (Suryanaraya Murthy, 2000) in the context of Indian de-
mography (see Iyer, 2002 for a more detailed discussion of this literature).
A close and comparative reading of the above texts suggests that the costs and benets
of sons compared to daughters may be dierent within Islam compared to Hinduism. While
both religions encourage marriage, the nature of the contract diers. An Islamic marriage
or the nikah, is dened not really as a sacrament, but more as a civil contract (Azim,
1997).4 Parents and guardians exercise control over the selection of marriage partners,
and a dower or `bride price' is paid to the bride or her guardian (Youssef, 1978, p.78).
The Koran recognizes the possibility of divorce and encourages remarriage of divorced or
widowed women (Qureshi, 1980: 564; Youssef, 1978: 88, Coulson and Hinchclie, 1978:
37-38). In the context of India, this is important for Muslim families as the investments in
daughters are frequently recoverable after marriage.
As in Islam, Hinduism also encourages all Hindus to enter married life.5 The marriage of
a daughter for Hindus is described as kanyadaan { this can be translated as the `donation'
of a daughter. Such a donation is believed to benet Hindu families both socially and
religiously (Niraula and Morgan, 1996). Once married, women cease to be members of
their natal home, and are generally not permitted to remarry in the event of divorce or
widowhood. Hindu marriages are often accompanied by the giving and taking of signicant
dowries, i.e. payments from the family of the bride to the groom (Edlund, 1999; Bhat and
Zavier, 2003; Rao, 1993; Bloch and Rao, 2002; Botticini and Siow, 2003). Women do not
have property rights over these dowries and they are not returned to her or her family in
the event of divorce or widowhood.
3The Sunnah are the interpretations of the words of Mohammad and their application to various situa-
tions.
4For a Muslim marriage to be legally valid, it needs to meet four conditions: proposal by one party;
acceptance by the other; the presence of a sucient number of witnesses (two in Sunni law); and a formal
expression of both the proposal and the acceptance at the same meeting (Azim 1997).
5For example Shakuntala, a princess from Hindu mythology tells Dushyanta her beloved that `when a hus-
band and wife are carrying on smoothly, then only pleasure, prosperity and piety are possible' (Deshpande,
1978: 91).
4Such distinctions between the `contractual' versus the `donational' notion of marriage
in Islam compared to Hinduism have implications for the relative costs and benets of
having sons and daughters. From a purely economic perspective, the net benet of having
daughters may be more `costly' for Hindu than for Muslim parents in India. Investments
in daughters are also not recoverable.
The preference for sons over daughters is also emphasized by other areas of Hindu ritual
and philosophy. For example, securing a good `rebirth' is believed to be directly related
to whether the eldest son of a deceased individual lights the funeral pyre. This sentiment
is echoed in many writings: `At the end of the (Sraddha) death ceremony the performer
asks, \Let me, O fathers, have a hero for a son!"' (Radhakrishnan, 1927, pp. 59-60).
Additionally, sons are believed to be a vital source of security in old-age. Daughters are
generally considered to `belong' to the family that they marry into, and so cannot be viewed
as a source of support to her natal family.
It must be emphasized that son-preference has also been documented in Islamic society.
Islamic law is patriarchal and patrilineal. Sons are given twice as large an inheritance as
daughters are and a man's testimony in court is worth twice that of a woman (Coulson and
Hinchclie, 1978). Women in Islamic societies have typically been restricted to a lifestyle
that guaranteed preservation of family honor and prestige and had limited opportunities
to participate in labor markets (Coulson and Hinchclie, 1978: 38; Obermeyer, 1992). We
simply argue that son-preference may less unequivocal as it is with Hindus. More recently,
some sociological evidence has also emphasized this. For example, in his study of 378
Muslim women and men in Mangalore, Azim found that over two-third of respondents in
his sample did not prefer sons, over daughters (Azim, 1997, p. 187); moreover, a large
proportion of those who did were from poor and illiterate households (Azim, 1997: 189).
Other nationally representative data from the National Family Health Surveys of India also
show that about one-third of Muslims do not prefer sons over daughters (Kishor, 1993). 6
The relative importance of sons and daughters may stem not only from theology, but
also from the dierential socio-economic circumstances of Hindus and Muslims (Iyer, 2002;
6An early example of the recognition of the contrast in gender norms comes from Maulana Ashraf Ali
Thanavi who wrote a compendium of useful knowledge for women. He condemned the practice of blessing a
woman by wishing her husband, brother, or children long life, or wishing for her many sons and grandsons
(Minault 1998, p. 62). He argued that this was not suciently Islamic because to view women blessed in
terms of their relation to men and sons devalues their relationship to God, and hence goes against the tenet
that all are equal in his sight.
5Dharmalingam and Morgan, 2004). For example, in India today, it seems important to
have educated sons, but in order to get daughters married, it is equally important to have
educated daughters. If the average levels of education among Muslim men are for example
lower than among Hindu men, then there may be lower educational investments also required
of Muslim women (Borooah and Iyer, 2005b). A related issue is land ownership { there
may be a greater desire on the part of Hindus to have sons in order to keep land within the
patrilineal family line. It is documented that land ownership among Muslims is less than
among Hindus (Shari, 1999). In summary, for reasons that stem both from theological
considerations, and from the socio-economic characteristics of religious groups, there may
be important dierences between Hindus and Muslims in their fertility and mortality of
sons compared to daughters. We next turn to a formal investigation of the socio-economic
determinants of fertility and mortality dierences between Hindus and Muslims.
3 Fertility, Mortality and Religion in India
India today has a total population of just over 1.1 billion people. Census data shows that
Hindus form over 80 percent of India's population, while Muslims form approximately 15
percent. Muslims are the most signicant `minority' population and consist of approxi-
mately 150 million people. Our description of contemporary India uses data from the newly
released 2005-06 National Family Health Survey (NFHS-3).7 The NFHS interviewed a total
of 123,385 women in 29 states of India. The survey is based on a sample of housesholds
that is representative at the state as well as national level. The religious composition of
the households is consistent with the ndings of the Indian Census (2001): 82 percent of
households are Hindu, 13 percent are Muslim, 3 percent are Christian, 2 percent are Sikh,
and the remainder are other religions. Among Hindus, the caste composition of our popu-
lation also mirrors the census. 44% of Hindu respondents reported that they belonged to
a \Scheduled Caste" or a \Scheduled Tribe" (henceforth referred to as Dalits), and 44% of
7The rst NFHS survey was conducted in 1992-93, and the second in 1998-99. All three surveys were
conducted in conjunction with the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MOHFW),Government of India.
Funding for the survey was provided by the United States Agency for International Development (US-
AID), the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID), the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation, UNICEF, UNFPA, and the government of India. Technical assistance was provided by Macro
International Maryland, USA.
6the Hindu population was higher caste or non-Dalit.8
We restrict our sample by including only those households that are Hindu and Muslim,
and in which at least one female respondent had borne children. This leaves us with a sample
of a total of 81,021 women. Panel A of Table 1 presents additional summary statistics for
the female sample.
The basis of our analysis is a comparison between the demographic and socio-economic
dierences between three subgroups of India's population: the Dalits, Muslims, and Hin-
dus. Since these categories are conceptually overlapping, we dene three mutually exlusive
categories: non-Dalit Hindus; Muslims; and Dalit Hindus.9
We begin with a comparison of socio-economic variables for the three groups in our
sample. The rst three columns of Table 2 explore dierences between non-Dalit Hindus
and Muslims, and the next three columns explore dierences between non-Dalit and Dalit
Hindus. Note that in nearly all respects, non-Dalit Hindus appear richer than Muslims
and their Dalit counterparts. They also have higher rates of schooling, lower fertility,
higher ownership of farmland and a lower chance of falling below the poverty line. In other
words, Muslims and Dalits both appear to be socio-economically disadvantaged relative
to upper-caste Hindus. The dierences are statistically signicant. Where Hindu Dalits
and Muslims diverge from each other signicantly is in the rates of female labor-force
participation. Muslim women work less than their non-Dalit Hindu counterparts, while
Dalit Hindus work more. The dierences are also visible in other indicators of female labor
force participation rates. Muslim women (Dalit women) are less (more) likely to be self-
employed, and less (more) likely to work away from home. These dierences are again
statistically signicant.
While Muslims are similar to Dalit Hindus on a range of socio-economic characteristics,
8The term 'Dalit' translates as 'the downtrodden', and refers specically to India's Scheduled Castes
and Sceduled Tribes - these are those castes and tribes recognised by the Indian Constitution as deserving
special recognition in respect of education, job reservation in employment, and political representation.
9While Dalits are also found among Muslims in India (Sachar Committee Report, 2006), we restrict our
attention to the Hindu Dalits. This is for two reasons. First, while 30% of Hindus are Dalits, the proportion
of Muslims reporting Dalit-status is approximately 2{5% (Sachar Committee Report, 2006). Second, among
Hindus, the criteria for being a Dalit are widely recognized. As mentioned in the footnote above, the Indian
government maintains ocial lists of \scheduled castes" and \scheduled tribes". Such benchmarks do not yet
exist among other groups, making the categorization of particular houses in a survey somewhat subjective.
In our sample, only 452 Muslim women reported themselves as Dalits. We included this group in our Muslim
sample, but excluded them from the Dalit sample.
7they appear to be quite similar to upper-caste Hindus in that they are less likely to expe-
rience the death of a child (particularly a girl), have higher female-male sex ratios among
children alive as well as among children ever-born, are less likely to use contraception and
have preferences for greater number of girls as well as boys, as evidenced by the greater
numbers of girls and boys that they regard as \ideal".10;11 In all these cases, the dierences
are statistically signicant. Age-specic fertility also conrms that Muslim women bear
larger numbers of children at earlier ages than women from other religious groups (Figure
1).
3.1 Fertility Dierences
To explore the often-cited fact about higher Muslim fertility, we construct from the female
sample the total number of children the woman has had (those born alive as well as those who
have died, but excluding miscarriages and stillborns). We rst examine the determinants of
fertility on the entire sample of women, and then restrict the sample to women over the ages
of 30 and 40. Estimation on the restricted sample permits us to examine the relationships
for women who have most likely completed their child-bearing.
We control for a variety of other individual, family and regional characteristics. First,
we control for a woman's age because of the well-known fact that children born to mothers
at very young or very old ages are more likely to die in infancy than children born to
mothers in prime childbearing ages. A second set of controls includes variables on whether
a woman (the child's mother) and her husband (the child's father) had completed primary
school. We also include a dummy variable indicating whether they had never attended
school. Third, we control for economic status using a wealth index. This index has been
developed and tested in a large number of countries and has been shown to be consistent
10Sex-ratios are measured at the level of the cluster/village rather than at the level of a woman. Since
a sex-ratio is dened as the number of females relative to the number of males, it can only be constructed
for a woman who has had at least one male birth. When aggregating at the level of the village or cluster
(which was the NFHS primary sampling unit) however, this problem is alleviated, since it is an average of
female and male deaths for a broad group of women.
11The low female-male ratio at birth may be attributed to the fact that the practice of sex selective abortion
is higher among upper-caste Hindus. This group has been shown to engage in this practice more than other
groups (Arnold, Kishor and Roy, 2002). However, since the NFHS data do not contain information on the
prevalence and practice of abortion, this is one aspect that we are not able to investigate comprehensively.
However, we do acknowledge, readily, the importance of these practices for the subject of this research.
8with expenditure and income measures (Rustein, 1999; Filmer and Pritchett, 2001).12 We
also include a control for whether the family resides in a rural area. Rural areas in India
typically have signicantly higher rates of infant mortality than urban areas. We nally add
dummy variables for states and the region in which an individual resides. This is intended
to capture state- or region-xed eects.
The results of the fertility regression are presented in Table 3. As expected, and based
on the summary statistics seen in Table 2, the coecients for Muslim and Hindu Non-Dalit
take opposite signs: Muslims have more children, and Hindu Non-Dalits have fewer children
than the omitted group (Dalits) and these dierences remain statistically signicant even
when all the control variables are included. Muslims have about 1 child more than Dalits and
Non-Dalits have about 0.3 fewer children than Dalits. We interepret this as evidence that
Muslim fertility is higher than Hindu fertility overall. Additionally, most measures of socio-
economic status have the expected negative sign in the fertility regressions. The household
wealth index as well as parental age and education are all associated with decreased fertility.
As widely seen in the empirical literature, maternal attributes have a stronger eect on
fertility than paternal attributes.
In results not shown here, we examine the robustness of the relationship between religion
and fertility by employing additional socio-economic and demographic variables such as the
use of contraception (traditional as well as modern), duration of the use of contraception,
exposure to mass media and nutritional indicators. Inclusion of these additional explanatory
variables had little to no eect on the two variables Muslim and Hindu Non-Dalit that are
central to our interest in this paper.
12The wealth index is constructed by combining information on 33 household assets and housing charac-
teristics such as ownership of consumer items, type of dwelling, source of water, and availability of electricity
into a single wealth index. These 33 assets are as follows: household electrication, type of windows, drink-
ing water source, type of toilet facility, type of ooring, material of exterior walls, type of roong, cooking
fuel, house ownership, number of household members per sleeping room, ownership of a bank account, own-
ership of a mattress, a pressure cooker, a chair, a cot/bed, a table, an electric fan, a radio/transmitter, a
black and white television, a color television, a sewing machine, a mobile phone, another other telephone, a
computer, a refrigerator, a watch or clock, a bicycle, a motorcycle or scooter, an animal-drawn cart, a car,
a water-pump, a thresher, and a tractor. Each household asset is assigned a weight (factor score) that is
generated through principal components analysis. The resulting asset scores are standardized in relation to
a normal household and is then assigned a score for each asset, and scores were summed for each household;
individuals are ranked according to the score of the household in which they reside.
93.2 Infant Mortality Dierences
We now turn to religious dierences in mortality risks. Our main specication relies on the
child sample, which includes all children ever born to women in the female sample described
above. The information was gathered from birth-histories and includes children who are
alive as well as those who died, and also includes children living within the household as
well as those who do not reside in the household any more. As child-death is a censored
variable and since the risk of death appears not to be limited to any particular age group,





where the dependent variable is the mortality hazard, or rather, the risk of death for a
particular child i. 0(t) is the baseline hazard, M
p
i is the dummy variable that indicates
whether the child's parents are Muslim, g is a general function and Xi is a vector of observ-
able characteristics that may aect a child's mortality risk. This model is a semi-parametric
model in the sense that it does not impose any functional form on the baseline specication.
Our working sample includes 218,769 children who are born to 79,118 Hindu and Muslim
mothers in the NFHS-3. Of the 218,769 children who were included in our sample, 25,784
(10.4 percent of the total) had died. The children's ages range from 0{37.13 For children
who died, the average age at death was 20 months.
The set of control variables is very similar to what was used in the female-sample. We
also include some additional controls: a dummy indicating whether the child is female,
his/her birth order, a dummy indicating whether the child born just previously was female,
indicators for whether any meat, dairy or plant-protein was consumed in the 24 hours
prior to the survey, and cluster-level averages of vaccination rates for measles, polio, BCG
and DPT.14 Cluster-level averages of female labor force participation rates and female self-
employment rates were also included. The subset of observations that has information on
13For those children who had died, the age variable was coded as age-at-death.
14It is important to note that the average immunization rates will only serve as a rough proxy for health-
care services in the cluster. Immunization rates could have changed considerably in many areas (though not
in the aggregate for the country) before or after the death of some of the children in the sample. In future
work, we will control for immunization levels by year of birth.
10all these observations gives us a nal sample of 195,080 children.
The results from the basic Cox-Hazard model (in the form of exponentiated coecients)
are presented in Table 4. Six models are estimated, starting with the simplest version, with
no control variables.15 Since the model is non-linear, the coecients of the variables Muslim,
Hindu Non-Dalit, Female, MuslimXFemale and Hindu Non-Dalit X Female do not provide
a measure of the relative risk of belonging to these groups. We calculate these separately
and present them in the top columns of Table 4 under the heading \Total Eects".16 Note
that the coecients that are of most interest to us { Muslim and Hindu Non-Dalit { take a
negative sign and are statistically signicant at the 1 percent level in all models, indicating
that individuals in both these groups face lower mortality risks than Dalit Hindus.
It is also noteworthy that the coecient for the dummy variable Female is positive
and signicant at the 1 percent level in all six models, conrming that there is a strong
female disadvantage in survival probabilities in India. Interestingly the interaction term
Female X Muslim is negative and signicant at the 1 percent level in all models, indicating
that the survival disadvantage is mitigated somewhat among Muslim girls. The coecient
for Hindu Non-Dalit X Female is negative in the rst two models (columns 1 and 2), but
then loses signicance (columns 3 to 6). This important result suggests that while caste
dierences are largely explained by dierences in socio-economic characteristics, the same
cannot be said of religious dierences. The robustness of the interaction Female X Muslim
is indicative that something specic to \being of the Muslim community" and not captured
by survey variables is partially explaining dierences in mortality rates between boys and
girls.17 We interpret this robust nding as supporting evidence for a religion-based theory
of the documented group dierences in demographic variables.
A close look at the estimates for the state-dummy variables provides some additional
intersting insights about the variation of mortality risks by state and region. The omitted
15STATA 10. The basic unit of time is one year.
16STATA 10 calculates these total eects using the command \lincom". The total eect for the variable
Muslim X Female for example, is calculated by multiplying 'the relative risk of the main eect of Muslim==1'
 'the relative risk of the main eect of Female=1'  'the relative risk of the interaction term (Muslim,
Female)=(1,1)).
17First, we interact the variable Female with additional controls (mother's and father's educational at-
tainment, wealth, rural-urban residence, and age at marriage) and then test whether the double interaction
terms Muslim X Female continued to have explanatory power. Second, we separate the sample of Hindus
and Muslims and perform the same tests. Both sets of results conrm that while these variables may have
considerable explanatory power, the dierences between groups remain signicant.
11state in the analysis is Jammu and Kashmir, a state where 56% of the population reports
that it is Muslim. Relative to this state, mortality is lower (and statistically signicant) in
the neighboring mountainous state of Himachal Pradesh and Uttaranchal. Mortality is also
lower in the south. The states of Goa and Kerala in particular display signicantly lower
risks of mortality. This is entirely expected based on the well-documented progress by these
states in the area of human-development (Dreze and Sen, 2001). The mortality risks are
higher than the baseline (and statistically signicant) in some states in the North and North-
East. These include Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Arunachal Pradesh, Tripura, Assam and
Jharkhand. Mortality is also higher (and statistically signicant) in Orissa, Chhatisgarh
and Madhya Pradesh. All other states display no statistically signicant mortality risks.
There is no evidence that the size of the Muslim population explains these eects.
In a separate analysis that is not shown here, we also explore the regional patterns of
mortality. Among our group of explanatory variables, we include interactions of the variable
Muslim with dummy variables corresponding to dierent regions. Results indicate that the
interaction, and the overall eect of region, is most signicant in the states of the North West
(Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Uttaranchal, Haryana, Punjab, Delhi, Rajasthan
and Uttar Pradesh). The regional eect is infact insignicant in the South (Goa, Karnataka,
Kerala and Tamil Nadu) as well as the North-East (Sikkim, Arunachal pradesh, Nagaland,
Manipur, Mizoram , Tripura, Meghalaya, Assam, West Bengal and Jharkhand). In other
regions, the Muslim eect as well as the regional eect remain signicant, but less so than
in the Northwestern states.
3.3 Robustness Checks
In order further to investigate the robustness of our ndings, we examine the question from
two dierent but complementary angles. First, we construct two mortality measures dened
at the level of the mother: (1) The fraction of ever-born boys who have died, and (2) The
fraction of ever-born girls who have died. In our regressions, we use the same set of control
variables as the one used in the regressions of the determinants of fertility (see Table 3).
The results of the mortality regressions are presented in Table 5. We see that the coecient
Muslim is negative and statistically signicant in all eight columns, indicating that Muslim
women are less likely than Hindus to experience the loss of a child, even when we control for
their poorer socio-economic status and location (columns 3{5 and then 8{10 include state
12xed eects). The coecient for Hindu Non-Dalit was negative and signicant in the case
without control variables (columns 1 and 2) but the variable lost signicance once other
controls and xed eects were included, indicating that they were statistically speaking no
dierent from their Dalit counterparts once we include measures of socio-economic status.
The Muslim eect however was robust and signicant, suggesting that the eect may not
be driven by socio-economic status, at least to the same extent as the Dalits.
As an additional robustness check, we perform a similar analysis using village-level
data.18 Our sample now consists of the 3644 villages in the NFHS-3, and our left-hand
side variable of interest will be average fertility of women in a village (dened as the total
number of children divided by the number of women who were interviewed in a village).
The dependent variables are as follows: the fraction of ever-born boys who had died before
the age of 5 and the fraction of ever-born girls who had died before the age of 5. The
set of our control variables is similar to that in the previous section, except that they are
constructed as village-level averages. We control for the fraction of a village's population
that is Muslim, as well as upper-caste Hindus. We also control for the average female
age, age at marriage, primary school completion and the fraction of the population that
has never attended school. Similar variables for men { average age, fraction of men who
completed primary school and fraction of men who never attended school { are also included
as controls. We also include a set of control variables that focus on wealth. Measures of
average landholdings, the average household wealth index and the fraction of households
that are rural, are included in this group of control variables. Finally, we also include a
set of community level averages for vaccination rates for measles, polio, DPT and BCG,
nutritional intakes and female labor force participation rates.
The results for male mortality are presented in columns 4{6 of Table 6 and the results
for female mortality are presented in columns 5{9. Note that the coecient for Muslim pop-
ulation is not signicant in the male mortality regressions, and is negative and signicant in
the female mortality regression that includes xed eects (column 9). On the contrary, the
coecient for Hindu Non-Dalit Population is negative and signicant in the male mortality
regressions without controls (column 4) and positive and signicant in the female mortality
regression with controls (column 8). We interpret this as evidence that Muslim girls exhibit
lower mortality rates than the Dalits, but upper-caste Hindu girls display higher mortality
18Ideally, we would like to have performed the analysis at the level of a district, but this was not possible
with the NFHS-3 dataset. District information was not included in the public release of the data.
13rates than the Dalits. Muslim boys however, do not display any signicant dierence in
mortality rates compared to the Dalits. Upper-caste Hindus however, diplay lower mor-
tality rates in this group, although this appears to be explained by their socio-economic
characteristics.
This set of ndings is consistent with the results from the child sample. Overall, all
the results conrm that Muslims experience lower levels of female mortality. The dierence
between Hindus and Muslims is not attributable to dierences in education, landholdings,
wealth, rural-urban residence or state of residence. While Dalits may also display lower
levels of female mortality, the Muslim eect appears to be stronger than the Dalit eect.
New research from immigrant communities in North America corroborates our nding
on the distinctive demographic characteristics of certain religious groups. Recent work by
Almond, Elund, and Milligan (2009), who study sex-ratios among immigrant communities
in Canada, nds relatively normal sex-ratios in the Muslim and Christian community, but
highly skewed sex-ratios among other religious groups.
We once again acknowledge that we can not rule out the possibility that unobserved
variations in socio-economic status may indeed be driving these results. However, unless
more national data become available, we must seriously consider the possibility that religion
may indeed be a driver of preferences for males and females in India. The survival advantage
of Muslim girls { as conrmed by our results from the child sample, woman sample and
village sample { suggest that India's \missing women" problem may be concentrated in
certain religious groups. This has major policy-implications for it suggests that the status of
women within particular caste- and religious-groups deserves greater analysis and attention
from academics as well as policy-makers.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we use recent data from the 2006 National Family Health Survey to explore the
relationship between religion and demographic outcomes in India. We nd that fertility and
demographic behavior vary not only across religious groups, but also across caste groups.
A comparison of socio-economic variables suggests that Muslims are similar to Dalit (lower-
caste) Hindus in that they are poorer and have more children, but unusually also exhibit
14lower infant mortality rates. Our econometric analysis conrms that these dierences persist
even when we control for socio-economic dcharacteristics, community characteristics and
location. Results from samples at the level of individual children, adult females and entire
villages all suggest that total infant mortality, and in particular, female infant mortality
is lower among Muslims than Hindus. This is an important result for it suggests that
India's \missing women" may be most concentrated in particular caste and religious groups
and may not be a general problem in the Indian population. The results of this paper also
suggest that the tendency to focus merely on dierences in fertility between religious groups
may be simplistic. While we can not rule out the possibility that unobserved aspects of
socio-economic status may be driving our results, we highlight the possibility that religion
and religious customs may have a direct eect on how daughters are valued in their families.
We believe that there is much scope for further research on the interations between religion,
fertility, gender and mortality in India.
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19Tables and Figures: Empirical Section
Figure 1: Age-specic fertility rates for women of all religious groups.
20Table 1: Summary statistics for variables used in regressions
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Panel (A): Female Sample
Percent of ever-born boys died before age 5 3.484 11.229 79118
Percent of ever-born girls died before age 5 2.997 10.271 79118
Muslim 0.131 0.338 79118
Hindu Non-Dalit 0.564 0.496 79118
Total number of children 3.034 1.789 79118
Woman's age 32.883 8.068 79118
Woman's age at marriage 17.828 3.801 79118
Woman never attended school 0.401 0.49 79118
Woman completed primary school 0.444 0.497 79118
Husband's age 38.58 9.142 79118
Husband never attended school 0.221 0.415 79118
Land (in acres) 4.706 20.811 79118
Wealth index 0.002 0.1 79118
Rural 0.562 0.496 79118
Panel (B): Child Sample
Muslim 0.155 0.362 218769
Female 0.479 0.5 218769
Muslim  Female 0.075 0.264 218769
Hindu Non-Dalit 0.524 0.499 218769
Hindu Non-Dalit  Female 0.249 0.433 218769
Birth order 2.531 1.669 218769
Previous sibling female 0.319 0.466 218769
Total number of siblings 3.062 2.117 218769
Mother's age 34.931 7.723 218769
Mother's age at marriage 17.08 3.469 218769
Mother never attended school 0.514 0.5 218769
Mother completed primary school 0.326 0.469 218769
Father's age 40.646 8.856 218769
Father never attended school 0.281 0.449 218769
Land (acres) 3.415 17.733 218769
Wealth index -0.016 0.097 218769
Rural 0.618 0.486 218769
AteMeat 0.026 0.16 218769
AtePlantProtein 0.03 0.171 218769
AteDairy 0.019 0.136 218769
Hemelevel 116.099 17.669 218769
Average measles vaccinations 0.547 0.262 218769
Average BCG vaccinations 0.795 0.234 218769
Average polio vaccinations 0.885 0.152 218769
Average DPT vaccinations 0.761 0.245 218769
Average female LFP 0.376 0.237 218769
Average female self-employed 0.069 0.104 218769
Panel (C): Cluster-level data
Fraction of boys died before age 1 0.087 0.072 3646
Fraction of girls died before age 1 0.077 0.073 3646
Muslim population 0.123 0.26 3628
Dalit population 0.313 0.312 3628
Average female age 37.311 2.291 3628
Continued on next page
21Table 1: Summary statistics for variables used in regressions
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Average female age at marriage 17.288 2.043 3628
Average female education 2.683 0.959 3628
Average male education 3.079 0.736 3628
Rural population 0.570 0.495 3628
Average land(in acres) 2.492 4.622 3628
Average wealth index scores -0.257 83.431 3628
Average of meat 0.015 0.038 3628
Average of plant protein 0.016 0.036 3628
Average of dairy 0.01 0.029 3628
Average of hemoglobin level 117.049 7.627 3628
Average of current female LFP 0.376 0.236 3644
Average of female self-employment 0.071 0.103 3644























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24Table 3: Fertility Regressions (female sample), Dependent Variable: Number of children born
All Women Age30 Age40
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Muslim 0.344 0.448 0.539 0.780 0.971
(0.110) (0.110) (0.0585) (0.0884) (0.127)
Hindu Non-Dalit -0.530 -0.280 -0.216 -0.285 -0.325
(0.0433) (0.0720) (0.0269) (0.0361) (0.0483)
Mother's age 0.124 0.114 0.0824 0.0766
(0.00852) (0.00642) (0.00398) (0.00539)
Mother's age at marriage -0.116 -0.114 -0.106 -0.106
(0.00669) (0.00453) (0.00486) (0.00472)
Mother never attended school 0.367 0.231 0.235 0.212
(0.0733) (0.0319) (0.0385) (0.0436)
Mother completed primary school -0.121 -0.113 -0.226 -0.340
(0.0306) (0.0222) (0.0305) (0.0464)
Father's age -0.0153 -0.00217 -0.00624 -0.0137
(0.00432) (0.00229) (0.00290) (0.00353)
Father never attended school 0.0934 0.124 0.133 0.133
(0.0408) (0.0262) (0.0359) (0.0566)
Land (in acres) -0.00178 -0.00194 -0.000826 -0.00239
(0.000383) (0.000627) (0.000586) (0.00105)
Wealth index -3.328 -3.471 -4.107 -4.420
(0.405) (0.303) (0.367) (0.403)
Rural population -0.0319 -0.0261 -0.00946 -0.0238
(0.0458) (0.0401) (0.0480) (0.0626)
Constant 3.288 1.628 1.288 2.447 2.957
(0.110) (0.142) (0.211) (0.166) (0.217)
State Fixed-Eects No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 79118 79118 79118 49342 19518
Adjusted R-squared 0.034 0.420 0.463 0.414 0.380
Table 3: Number of children per woman, inclusive of any who died. Standard errors in parentheses:  p < 0:10, 
p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
25Table 4: Cox Proportional Hazard Model (child sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Eects:
Female 0.430 0.339 0.359 0.357 0.364 0.360
(0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105)
Muslim -0.351 -0.558 -0.375 -0.372 -0.372 -0.366
(0.0694) (0.0704) (0.0696) (0.0697) (0.0709) (0.0724)
Hindu Non-Dalit -0.472 -0.312 -0.144 -0.144 -0.149 -0.178
(0.0479) (0.0470) (0.0466) (0.0467) (0.0470 (0.0477)
Muslim X Female -0.180 -0.482 -0.271 -0.268 -0.264 -0.254
(0.0693) (0.0705) (0.0704) (0.0705) (0.0713) (0.0730)
Non-Dalit Hindu X Female -0.301 -0.236 -0.0409 -0.0401 -0.0417 -0.0662
(0.0477) (0.0469) (0.0474) (0.0474) (0.0476) (0.0481)
Coecients:
Muslim -0.458 -0.707 -0.513 -0.509 -0.511 -0.499
(0.0720) (0.0730) (0.0728) (0.0729) (0.0739) (0.0754)
Female 0.171 0.0757 0.104 0.103 0.107 0.112
(0.0462) (0.0466) (0.0466) (0.0466) (0.0466) (0.0467)
Muslim X Female 0.107 0.149 0.138 0.137 0.139 0.133
(0.0946) (0.0952) (0.0947) (0.0947) (0.0947) (0.0947)
Hindu Non-Dalit -0.625 -0.426 -0.261 -0.260 -0.266 -0.293
(0.0503) (0.0502) (0.0504) (0.0505) (0.0507) (0.0510)
Hindu Non-Dalit X Female 0.153 0.114 0.117 0.116 0.117 0.115
(0.0651) (0.0652) (0.0651) (0.0651) (0.0651) (0.0650)
Birth order 0.138 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143
(0.00905) (0.00916) (0.00916) (0.00917) (0.00921)
Previous sibling female -0.00499 0.00357 0.00274 0.00570 0.00510
(0.0315) (0.0314) (0.0314) (0.0314) (0.0314)
Total number of siblings 0.171 0.0811 0.0811 0.0735 0.0649
(0.00888) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0105) (0.0107)
Mother's age 0.0227 0.0228 0.0227 0.0215
(0.00473) (0.00474) (0.00473) (0.00471)
Mother's age at marriage -0.0284 -0.0284 -0.0285 -0.0265
(0.00604) (0.00607) (0.00608) (0.00619)
Mother never attended school 0.192 0.192 0.171 0.149
(0.0509) (0.0509) (0.0510) (0.0517)
Mother completed primary school -0.244 -0.244 -0.243 -0.259
(0.0714) (0.0714) (0.0713) (0.0715)
Father's age 0.000984 0.000917 0.00211 0.00400
(0.00365) (0.00366) (0.00367) (0.00377)
Father never attended school 0.105 0.105 0.103 0.116
(0.0363) (0.0363) (0.0364) (0.0368)
Land (acres) -0.00104 -0.00103 -0.00113 -0.00148
(0.00108) (0.00108) (0.00108) (0.00108)
Wealth index -3.621 -3.591 -3.501 -3.065
(0.285) (0.286) (0.290) (0.308)
Rural -0.0523 -0.0508 -0.0615 -0.0762
(0.0443) (0.0444) (0.0457) (0.0468)
Ate Meat -0.290 -0.279 -0.263
(0.173) (0.173) (0.173)
Ate Plant Protein 0.0861 0.0792 0.0578
(0.128) (0.129) (0.128)
Continued on next page
26Table 4: Cox Proportional Hazard Model (child sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ate Dairy 0.0981 0.125 0.118
(0.178) (0.178) (0.177)
Hemelevel -0.00155 -0.00152 -0.000893
(0.000925) (0.000926) (0.000954)
Average measles vaccinations -0.435 -0.282
(0.110) (0.114)
Average BCG vaccinations 0.0919 0.158
(0.157) (0.163)
Average polio vaccinations 0.160 -0.0404
(0.127) (0.136)
Average DPT vaccinations 0.0702 0.0599
(0.151) (0.156)
Average female LFP -0.00575 0.194
(0.0756) (0.0871)
Average female self-employed 0.0659 0.267
(0.151) (0.165)
State Dummies No No No No No Yes
N 195080 195080 195080 195080 195080 195080
Chi-squared 286.7 1977.8 2449.8 2471.8 2502.2 2912.8



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































28Table 6: Cluster-level mortality regressions (village sample)
Fraction of Boys Died Fraction of Girls Died
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Muslim population -0.00719 -0.00519 -0.00362 -0.00635 -0.00502 -0.00556
(0.00552) (0.00318) (0.00324) (0.00614) (0.00319) (0.00322)
Hindu Non-Dalit population -0.00913 0.00144 0.000537 -0.00450 0.00503 0.00114
(0.00354) (0.00235) (0.00212) (0.00360) (0.00270) (0.00211)
Average female age 0.000199 0.000172 0.0000599 0.0000116
(0.000119) (0.000113) (0.000116) (0.000112)
Average female age at marriage -0.000514 -0.000307 -0.000230 0.0000772
(0.000279) (0.000261) (0.000237) (0.000259)
Average female education -0.0135 -0.0119 -0.0108 -0.00779
(0.00187) (0.00184) (0.00221) (0.00183)
Average male education 0.000496 0.000180 -0.00182 -0.00176
(0.00229) (0.00204) (0.00290) (0.00202)
Rural population -0.00170 0.00149 0.00264 0.00575
(0.00248) (0.00233) (0.00295) (0.00231)
Average land (in acres) 0.0000233 0.0000229 0.0000659 0.0000560
(0.0000850) (0.0000642) (0.0000641) (0.0000638)
Average wealth index scores -0.0000970 -0.0000811 -0.0000782 -0.0000637
(0.0000140) (0.0000134) (0.0000126) (0.0000133)
Average of meat -0.0287 0.0142 -0.0812 -0.00396
(0.0176) (0.0206) (0.0149) (0.0205)
Average of plant protein -0.0145 -0.0163 -0.0242 -0.0296
(0.0152) (0.0179) (0.0189) (0.0178)
Average of dairy -0.0595 -0.0430 -0.0228 0.00292
(0.0227) (0.0228) (0.0237) (0.0226)
Average of hemoglobin level -0.000639 -0.000539 -0.000719 -0.000568
(0.000164) (0.000147) (0.000164) (0.000146)
Average of measles vaccinations -0.00463 -0.000318 0.000182 0.00416
(0.00530) (0.00533) (0.00487) (0.00529)
Average of BCG vaccinations -0.0151 -0.00282 -0.0186 -0.00678
(0.0115) (0.00952) (0.0115) (0.00946)
Average of polio vaccinations 0.0322 0.0200 0.0370 0.0116
(0.0126) (0.00827) (0.0128) (0.00822)
Average of DPT vaccinations -0.0159 -0.0127 -0.0287 -0.0186
(0.00835) (0.00949) (0.00935) (0.00943)
Average female LFP 0.000960 0.00657 -0.00298 0.00778
(0.00654) (0.00476) (0.00607) (0.00473)
Average female self-employment 0.00112 -0.00559 0.0162 0.0114
(0.0112) (0.00943) (0.0118) (0.00938)
Constant 0.0766 0.185 0.158 0.0656 0.189 0.155
(0.00546) (0.0195) (0.0187) (0.00572) (0.0208) (0.0186)
State Fixed Eects No No Yes No No Yes
N 3644 3637 3637 3644 3637 3637
R-squared 0.00487 0.202 0.236 0.00152 0.201 0.250
Table 6: Regressions based on 3644 clusters. Standard errors in parentheses:  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
29